Memory poisoning has moved from a research curiosity to a named enterprise risk in under a year. An attacker no longer needs to break into a system in the usual sense. They need to get one false statement written into what an AI agent remembers, and the agent will do the rest, session after session, with full confidence. The category now has its own entry in the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026, listed as ASI06, Memory and Context Poisoning, a framework developed with more than 100 industry experts and published by the OWASP GenAI Security Project. That listing matters because it changes the conversation inside companies. Memory is no longer a feature detail for engineers to tune. It is an attack surface that security teams, procurement teams and boards can name.
The numbers explain why the category earned its place. In July 2026, researchers disclosed MemGhost, an automated attack that plants a persistent false fact in a personal agent through a single crafted email. The Hacker News reported that the attack worked in 87.5 percent of background mode runs against OpenClaw running on GPT-5.4, and in 71.4 percent of runs against a Claude Code SDK agent on Sonnet 4.6, across 56 fresh test cases. The agent read the email, wrote the false statement into its own long-term memory, said nothing about the write in its visible reply, and then answered later questions as if the planted statement were true. In one test case, the planted statement raised a user's daily transfer limit to $10,000. The figure was invented. The agent treated it as fact.
Memory poisoning is not prompt injection
The distinction matters, and OWASP drew it for a reason. A prompt injection lives and dies inside one session. An attacker slips an instruction into a document or a web page, the model follows it once, and the damage ends when the conversation ends, even if that single incident is serious. Memory poisoning works on a different clock. The payload is written into a store that the agent loads again at the start of every later session, or retrieves whenever a related question arrives. The write and the harm can sit weeks apart, with different people on each side of the gap. The person who receives the wrong answer never saw the message that caused it. The person who sent the message never sees the answer it produced. That separation is what makes the attack hard to detect with the tools companies already have, which watch sessions, not stores.
The same separation defeats the usual incident response. When a model gives a wrong answer, teams check the prompt, the retrieved documents and the model version. If the false statement sits in long-term memory, none of those checks find it, because the prompt was clean and the retrieval worked as designed. The system returned exactly what it had stored. The failure happened earlier, at the moment of writing, when a statement entered memory without a source, a date, a named author or a review. Security teams have a word for records with those properties in every other part of the business. They call them unaudited. Agent memory, in most products on the market today, is unaudited by design.
Five texts can move a knowledge base
The second line of research attacks the shared store rather than the personal one. PoisonedRAG, presented at USENIX Security 2025, showed that injecting five malicious texts per target question into a knowledge base of millions of documents reached an attack success rate of about 90 percent (summary and reproduction). The poisoned texts were built in two parts: one part crafted to be retrieved for the target question, and one part carrying the false answer. Retrieval did what retrieval is built to do. It ranked the crafted text highly because the text matched the question well. The model then answered from the text it was given.
The defences tested against that attack should worry buyers more than the attack itself. Perplexity filtering failed because the poisoned texts were written by a language model and read fluently. Paraphrasing the query failed because the poison matched the meaning of the question, not its exact words. Retrieving more documents failed because the poison stayed in the retrieved set and the model kept weighting it. With those defences in place, attack success stayed around 30 percent or higher in the reproduction work. Each defence was a single checkpoint, and a single checkpoint is a single point of failure. An attacker who knows which check a system runs can tune the payload to pass that check. Layered checks, applied at writing, at retrieval and at answer time, are harder to pass in sequence, and the research points that way even though no tested product yet ships the full stack.
Query-only injection, and the honest caveat
The third line of research removes the need for write access altogether. MINJA, short for Memory Injection Attack, works through ordinary queries, the same access any normal user has. Dong and co-authors reported an injection success rate above 95 percent and an attack success rate above 70 percent on most datasets tested, achieved by guiding the agent, step by step, to record a malicious record as if it were its own conclusion (MINJA paper). No elevated privilege was required. The agent wrote the record itself.
The caveat belongs in the same paragraph as the headline number, because the follow-up work found it. A systematic study of memory poisoning in electronic health record agents, testing GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct on MIMIC-III clinical data, found that realistic conditions cut attack effectiveness sharply. A memory store already full of legitimate, consistent records forced a single poisoned entry to compete against a large body of established fact, and it often lost. Sparse stores were the weak point. A new deployment, a new agent, a new team workspace with little history: these carry the highest risk precisely when the organisation has the least operational experience with the tool. That finding turns a common assumption on its head. Teams tend to relax controls early, while a system is small, and tighten them later. The research says the early phase is when the write path needs the strictest control.
The quiet version happens without an attacker
Most company memory will not be poisoned by an adversary. It will be poisoned by ordinary work, through the same mechanism, with no malice involved. A draft figure enters a channel before finance corrects it. A policy changes, and the old version stays in the store beside the new one, with nothing to say which one is current. A confident summary of a meeting records a decision that the meeting discussed but never took. Each statement is written once and read many times, by people and by agents, long after its context has moved on.
The practitioner conversation shows the same failure in miniature. In a widely discussed Reddit thread in r/AI_Agents, a user described an agent that kept recommending restaurants in Delhi after the user had moved to Mumbai, because the older record scored higher at retrieval than the newer fact (thread summary). The replies converged on the same fix: canonical facts with a subject, a value and a validity period, and explicit supersession when a new statement replaces an old one. That is not a retrieval problem. It is a record-keeping problem. The store held two incompatible facts and had no rule for which one governed.
Enterprise survey data shows the cost at scale. VentureBeat Pulse surveyed 101 enterprises in June 2026 and found that 57 percent had traced a confident but wrong agent answer to missing or inconsistent business context in the previous six months, with 31 percent saying it had happened more than once. By the July wave, the figure had risen to 68 percent. A separate report by MIT Technology Review Insights, based on a survey of 300 data and AI executives and published on 5 October 2026, found that only about 34 percent of agentic AI projects reach production on average, with a lack of knowledge and context named among the key points of failure, and data fragmentation cited as a top challenge by 55 percent of respondents. None of these surveys describe an attacker. They describe stores that accumulate statements faster than anyone verifies them.
The counter-argument, stated fairly
The strongest counter-argument runs like this. Memory poisoning research uses test setups built to be attacked: small stores, permissive write paths, agents configured to save what they read. Production enterprise systems sit behind identity controls, vendor review and network boundaries, so the published success rates overstate the real risk. There is also a simpler answer available: give agents less memory, or none. A stateless agent cannot be poisoned across sessions, and many tasks need no persistent record at all.
Both points hold, within limits. The health record study cited above is itself evidence for the first point: full, well-populated stores resist injection far better than the test setups do. The second point is sound advice for narrow, single-session tasks. The limits appear where the work itself needs memory. A company cannot run hiring, sales, support or operations on agents that forget every decision, every definition and every commitment at the end of each conversation. The work product of a company is, in large part, its accumulated record of what it decided and why. Removing memory removes the attack and the value in the same move. The question for companies is therefore not whether agents remember. It is whether what they remember carries the properties that let a person check it, challenge it and remove it.
A provenance framework for memory poisoning defence
The research, read together, points to one organising principle: treat every memory write as a record entering a company system of record, with the controls that status has always required. Five controls follow from that principle, and each one maps to a failure the studies documented.
First, provenance on every entry. Each stored statement carries its source, the person or system that supplied it, the date it was recorded and the source it came from, in metadata that travels with the statement into retrieval and into the answer. OWASP's own defence baseline for ASI06 names provenance tagging as the control that survives an attack in which the payload has already become a trusted fact, because it is the only property that lets a reader separate a verified source from a planted one after the fact (defence summary).
Second, draft status by default. A statement an agent extracts from a conversation, an email or a document enters memory as a draft, not as a fact. It can inform a draft answer, clearly grounded in its source, but it does not join the shared record until a person reviews and publishes it. This single rule breaks the MemGhost chain at its strongest link: the silent, automatic write. If no write is silent and no write is automatic, a crafted email has nowhere to land.
Third, supersession with dates. When a new statement conflicts with an old one, the system keeps both, shows both with their dates and sources, and marks one as governing until a person resolves the conflict. The Delhi and Mumbai failure cannot happen in a store with this rule, because the newer fact does not have to outscore the older one at retrieval. It replaces it by rule, and the replacement is visible.
Fourth, expiry for unverified entries. OWASP's baseline also calls for unverified data to expire on a defined schedule rather than persist without limit. A draft that nobody reviewed within the window a company sets leaves the store. Expiry converts the default from permanent until challenged, which favours the attacker and the stale policy alike, to temporary until confirmed, which favours the record.
Fifth, deletion that propagates. When a source document is deleted or corrected at the source, the change flows into every derived form: the extracted fact, the summary and the embedding. A correction that fixes the document but leaves the derived fact in place is not a correction an agent will ever read. Companies already accept this standard for records they hold under privacy law. Agent memory should meet the same standard, because it holds the same material in a more usable form.
What this means for a company brain
A company brain, one shared record of how a company works, sits directly in the path of every attack described above, because it is the memory other systems will read. That position is a risk and an advantage at once. The risk is plain: a poisoned company record misleads every employee and every agent that consults it, not just one user in one session. The advantage is structural. A company brain built as a readable record, with boards a person can open, drafts a person must publish and decisions stored as entries with a named decider and a date, has the review surface that a vector store or a memory file never offers. You cannot audit a store you cannot read. The full account of that design sits in How Jilu Works, and the context graphs article sets out why decisions, not documents alone, need to be first-class entries in the record.
The practical test for any vendor in this category now fits in one meeting. Ask who can write to memory, and whether a write can happen without a person seeing it. Ask what metadata each entry carries, and whether an answer can show it. Ask what happens when two entries conflict, which one governs, and who decides. Ask how an entry expires, and how a deletion at the source reaches the derived record. A vendor with real answers has built memory as a record. A vendor with demonstrations instead has built memory as a feature, and the research above describes what happens to features under pressure.
Companies spent two decades learning to govern the documents their employees read. The next two years will test whether they govern what their agents remember with the same care. The attacks are published, the categories are named and the controls are known. What separates a poisoned record from a trustworthy one is not the model. It is whether anyone designed the write path as if the record mattered, because to every agent that reads it later, the record is the company itself.